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This note analyses the design of agri-environmental schemes for risk-averse producers
whose input usage is only observable by costly monitoring. The scheme penalises pro-
ducers in proportion to input use in excess of a quota. A striking result is that if the
scheme is designed in such a way that producers always comply with the quota, risk








Agri-environmental schemes generally have two common features. First,
because they are voluntary, participation requires compensation. Second,
participation involves a management agreement or contract between the producer
and regulator, in which the producer agrees to adopt some environmentally
beneﬁcial action (e.g. reducing fertiliser usage or stocking rates, or providing
a public good by fencing to exclude stock from remnant bush) in return for a
compensation payment. Since taxpayers provide these compensation
payments, and taxation itself incurs a deadweight loss, the regulator aims to
pay compensation which covers the costs of compliance and no more.
There are two well-known problems associated with input-based agri-
environmental schemes: ﬁrst, hidden information or adverse selection arises
when individual producers have more information about the cost of compliance
than the regulator, which provides an incentive for them to claim compensation
payments higher than their own compliance costs; second, hidden action or
moral hazard occurs if the regulator cannot monitor compliance perfectly,
which provides an incentive for producers to seek rent through non-compliance.
The implications of hidden information in agri-environmental policy have
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. (2001) and Fraser
(2002). More recent work, by Hogan (2002), White (2002) and Ozanne and
White (2007), has sought to model the two types of information asymmetry
simultaneously.
Two key issues in this work relate to the treatment of producer risk








. (2001) developed a principal-agent model of hidden action in agri-
environmental schemes for risk-averse producers, in which producers who are
caught cheating pay ﬁxed ﬁnes. White (2002) and Ozanne and White (2007),
on the other hand, assumed producers are risk neutral and face variable
ﬁnes, which depend on the amount of input applied in excess of the quota.
There is strong evidence that most producers are risk-averse (Bond and Wonder









Abadi Ghadim and Pannell 2003). In addition, ﬁnes imposed by courts
generally depend on the severity of the crime; for example, ﬁnes for speeding
increase according to the difference between a car’s speed and the speed limit.








. (2001) and Ozanne and White (2007) to allow for both risk aversion and
variable ﬁnes.
The contribution of this note is to analyse the design of contracts for risk-
averse producers where actions are costly to monitor. The model presented
below starts by assuming, that the regulator has information on producers’
risk preferences. However, in an interesting special case, the risk associated
with the contract is eliminated and self-compliance is ensured whatever the
risk preferences of the producer. Although the primary model has the potential
for achieving more abatement with lower monitoring cost, the latter may be
more realistic as it does not depend upon unrealistic assumptions about the




Following Laffont and Tirole (1993, p. 55) we assume that a utilitarian
regulator maximises the following constrained equivalent objective function

















































































































































































probability of the regulator detecting non-compliance.








), on the right-hand side of Equation (1) is the environ-


















































* is the proﬁt-maximising input use. The second term, in squared brackets,
gives the expected producer surplus from participating with expected utility 
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pw(b + π(x) − η(x − s)) over non-participation w(π*), where
w(π) is the utility of proﬁt, w′(π) > 0 and w″(π) ≤ 0; π* = π(x*) is unrestricted
proﬁt and the restricted proﬁt function is deﬁned such that π(x) < π*, π′(x) ≥ 0,
and π″(x) < 0. The third terms gives net transfer payments adjusted for the
shadow price of public funds, e. For simplicity, monitoring costs are linear, mp,
where the parameter m represents the cost of monitoring a farm with certainty,
p = 1. The payoff expected by a producer participating in the scheme depends on
whether she chooses to comply with the contract, on the probability of detection
if non-compliance is chosen, and on the penalty imposed for exceeding the
input quota. The penalty for non-compliance is an exogenous ﬁne of η per
unit of input above the quota, s; that is, a producer who chooses input level
x > s faces a possible ﬁne of η(x − s). All terms are summarised in Table 1.
Expected social welfare (1) is maximised subject to two behavioural
constraints. First, individual rationality (IR) requires that producers prefer, or
are indifferent between, participation and non-compliance at input level x ≥ s
to non-participation at level x*:
(1 − p)w(b + π(x)) + pw(b + π(x) − η(x − s)) ≥ w(π*) (2)
Second, incentive compatibility (IC) requires that producers weakly prefer
participation and non-compliance at level x ≥ s  to participation and non-
compliance at level w ≥ x ≥ s:
Table 1 Deﬁnitions of Variables, Functions and Parameters
Term Description 
Variables:
z Approximate social welfare function 
x Input use
˛ solution to (5) accounts for risk aversion;
5 ﬁrst-best perfect information solution;
≈ solution to (13) special case;
x* proﬁt maximising input.
s  Input quota
p  probability of monitoring
b  Transfer payment to the producer
Functions:
π(x)P r oﬁt as a function of input.
π* maximum proﬁt
υ(x)E n vironmental cost of input use
w(π) Is the utility function
Parameters:
e Shadow price of public funds
m Monitoring cost to visit a single farm
η Fine per unit of excess input
η
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(1 − p)w(b + π(x)) + pw(b + π(x) − η(x − s)) 
≥ (1 − p)w(b + π(w)) + pw(b + π(w) − η(w − s)) (3)
Using a Taylor series expansion it can be shown that, in the limit w → x, the
IC constraint (3) for x ≥ s simpliﬁes to:
(1 − p)w′(b + π(x))π′(x) + pw′(b + π(x) − η(x − s))(π′(x) − η) ≤ 0 (4)
The IR constraint ensures that the producer will participate in the scheme
using an input level of, at least, x. However, this is a minimum input level,
and if only constraint (2) were included in the model, the producer would
have an incentive to exceed this minimum. The IC condition (4), which states
that at input level x the marginal expected utility of proﬁt must be non-positive,
requires that the probability of detection is high enough to ensure that the
producer does not exceed x.
The policy scheme is as follows. The regulator determines the producer’s utility
function and proﬁt function, then offers a contract based on this information
which includes a monitoring probability. The producer responds by accepting
the contract and deciding on an input level. If the producer is monitored and
the input level is found to be above quota, a ﬁne is levied.
The regulator’s problem, allowing for hidden action, producer risk aversion,
and a variable ﬁne for over quota input use, can now be summarised as follows.
The objective function (1) is maximised subject to the non-negativity
constraints, x ≥ 0, s ≥ 0 and b ≥ 0, the IR constraint (2), and the IC constraint
(4). The internal solution is:
(5)
where,
Thus, the regulator offers the producer the contract (s, b, π), the producer
chooses input level ˛ and faces an expected ﬁne of πη(˛ − s). There is a trade-
off between increasing abatement and increasing the cost of monitoring
compliance, which is conditioned by producer risk preferences.
Assuming risk neutrality, Equation (5) simpliﬁes to:
(6)
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and if zero cost monitoring is assumed as well as risk neutrality it
becomes
(1 + e)π′(5) = −v′(t) (7)
Expression (6) shows that ˛ ≥ 5, that is, input abatement by a risk-neutral
producer whose actions are costly to monitor will be less than that for a risk-
neutral producer under perfect information. This implies that hidden action
reduces the efﬁciency of agri-environmental schemes if producers are
risk-neutral. However, the same conclusion cannot be so readily drawn from
expression (5), where the trade-offs between more abatement (lower x), larger
ﬁnes (lower s), and higher costs of monitoring compliance (higher p) are
conditioned by producer risk preferences.
The model presented above is based on the assumption that the regulator
knows the producer’s attitude to risk. However, risk preferences may vary
across producers, and be difﬁcult to estimate. Thus, even if the regulator has
information on the range of risk attitudes they may not know how they are
distributed across producers. As Leathers and Quiggin (1991) and Isik (2002)
have pointed out, this means the effects of environmental policy on input use
may be ambiguous. Peterson and Boisvert (2002) have suggested one approach
for dealing with this problem, which involves treating risk preferences as an
additional source of hidden information and accommodating them through
stochastic efﬁciency rules. Here, we take a simpler approach and design a
special case of the above hidden-action contract in such a way that the risk
associated with it is eliminated and the solution is independent of producer
risk preferences.
This no-cheating, no-risk contract is obtained by setting s = x, so that a
utility-maximising producer is induced to comply with the contract and the
expected ﬁne is zero. The social welfare function (1) simpliﬁes to:
E[z] = v(x) + [w(b + π(x)) − w(π*)] − (1 + e)(b + mp) (8)
Setting s = x, the IR constraint (2) simpliﬁes to:
w(b + π(x)) ≥ w(π*) (9)
indicating that the producer prefers participation and compliance x = s
to non-participation x = x*. Since w(π) is assumed to be monotonic, this
simpliﬁes to:
b + π(x) ≥ π* (10)
Similarly, the IC constraint (3) simpliﬁes to:
pηw′(b + π(x)) ≥ π′(x)w′(b + π(x)) (11)208 A. Ozanne and B. White
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It can be seen immediately that the marginal utility terms in Equation (11)
cancel, thus eliminating risk preferences from the optimal contract; the IC
constraint becomes simply
pη ≥ π′(x) (12)
The solution to the regulator’s objective maximisation problem, now repre-
sented by Equation (8), IR constraint (10), binding IC constraint (12), which
implies pη = π′(x) and the non-negativity constraints x ≥ 0 and b ≥ 0, is:
(13)
Expression (13) is identical to Equation (6), the solution obtained from the
original model for a risk neutral producer, which shows that optimal contracts
designed in this way are independent of risk preferences.
If the marginal cost of monitoring is zero, m = 0, or the ﬁne rate is very
large, such that η → ∞, Equation (13) gives the same solution as Equation (7),
≈ = 5. However, because all reference to risk preferences have disappeared
from Equation (13), it is impossible to achieve the optimal solution if
monitoring costs depend on the frequency of monitoring, that is m ≠ 0, and
the ﬁne rate, η, is ﬁnite. Thus, although the restricted model has the advantage
that, to implement it, the regulator does not need to have information on
individual producer’s risk preferences, it has the corresponding disadvantage
that the regulator will not account for any risk aversion within the group of
farmers.
From Equation (13) the minimum feasible ﬁne η
min is deﬁned by the point
where ≈ = x* as π′(x*) = 0 and the monitoring costs are given:
To simplify the comparative static analysis, we deﬁne the parameter h = (m/η)
to represent the monitoring cost relative to the ﬁne. In terms of determining
the level of input, this ratio is of critical importance. Making this substitution,
taking the total derivative of Equation (13) and rearranging yields:
(14)
This derivative has an indeterminate sign unless further assumptions are
imposed. If we assume v(x) is linear and π′″(x) > 0 which, for instance, applies
for a strictly concave proﬁt function derived from a Cobb–Douglas production
function, it follows that dx/dh > 0, which indicates that as the costs of moni-
toring increase relative to the ﬁne, the input quota increases.
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4. Numerical examples
In this example, a producer is offered a voluntary contract to reduce the
nitrogen input per hectare. Subsequently, nitrogen input is monitored, which
is costly, and, if producers are found to be in excess of the quota, they pay a
ﬁne, which depends upon the level of excess. The farm’s production function
for wheat yield, y, is given by   The producer’s utility function is given
by w(π) = π
θ and the beneﬁt of input abatement is given by v(x) = υ(x* – x).
The initial values of the parameters used in the simulations are given in
Table 2.
In the contract, the regulator directly chooses the input quota, s, the
frequency of monitoring, p, and the transfer payment, b; indirectly, the
regulator induces the producer to use a particular level of input, x (the hats
used in preceding sections). The most interesting result from this analysis is
the difference between the general solution (5) and special case (13), as this
indicates how critical it is for the regulator to account for risk aversion in
contract design. The difference in the objective function between the general
and special case indicates the value to the regulator of information on the
producer’s risk aversion.
The two solutions from Equations (5) and (13) are the same in the case
where the ﬁne is zero. As the monitoring cost tends towards zero, the second
terms on the right hand sides of Equations (5) and (13) also tend towards
zero and the target input and actual input converge. Similarly, as the ﬁne is
increased, the target input and actual input converge.
Table 3 shows the change in the general solution and special case as the
monitoring cost increases. This has a predictable effect: in both cases, the input
quota is relaxed and the probability of monitoring reduced. The monitoring
probability is always higher in the special case as it is necessary to maintain
an incentive for compliance with the quota.




Table 2 Parameters and Initial Values for the Numerical Simulation
Parameters Initial value Units
pw 220 $ per tonne wheat
px 2.3 $ per kg nitrogen
e 0.1
υ 2$   per kg abatement per ha
β0 1.155
β1 0.30
m 100 $ per ha for monitoring
η 4$   per kg per ha excess
π* 797.447 $per ha return over nitrogen cost
x* 148.593 kg per ha
θ 0.7 utility function parameter210 A. Ozanne and B. White
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The notable result from Table 3 is that the social welfare function is little
different between the general case (5) and the special case (13). Thus in this
numerical example there is almost no difference between the social welfare
between the two cases and little is gained by the regulator from knowing
producers’ risk aversion.
5. Conclusion
Two models of agri-environmental policy under hidden action have been
developed using an input quota/compensation payment scheme that allows
for risk-averse behaviour by producers and variable ﬁnes rather than ﬁxed
ﬁnes for producers who are caught cheating. The general model assumes that
the regulator has information about the risk preferences of individual pro-
ducers, and shows how it can use this information to induce producers to
reduce input use and reduce monitoring costs. The second model is a special,
no-risk, case of the general model, which deters all cheating by producers
regardless of their risk preferences. Comparative static analysis indicates the
importance of the ﬁne in relation to monitoring costs: for a viable policy
under high monitoring costs the ﬁne rate must be relatively high.
The striking result from this paper, and one which has policy signiﬁcance, is
that if the regulator adjusts the quota to the level of input that the producer
is expected to use, the optimal input and level of monitoring is determined by
a relatively simple formula which depends upon the curvature of the proﬁt
function, but not the degree of risk aversion. This result has implications for
environmental and natural resource management schemes in Australia that
involve input restrictions. These include the usual agri-environmental schemes
and irrigation management schemes. The contracts for these schemes need to
be reinforced by monitoring, and the results in this paper suggest that the
Table 3 Optimal Solution with Monitoring Cost Increasing 
  
mx s p b z
General Solution Equation (5)
0.00 64.65 64.65 0.45 58.62 103.39
50.00 75.58 62.94 0.34 58.66 81.70
100.00 84.45 58.61 0.27 58.52 64.91
150.00 92.07 52.01 0.22 58.14 51.54
200.00 98.82 42.88 0.18 57.63 40.75
250.00 104.88 30.03 0.14 57.37 32.03
Special Case Equation (13)
0.00 64.65 64.65 0.45 58.62 103.39
50.00 75.60 75.60 0.35 41.15 81.58
100.00 84.58 84.58 0.28 29.96 64.48
150.00 92.41 92.41 0.23 22.07 50.66
200.00 99.46 99.46 0.19 16.25 39.34
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regulator should focus on assessing producers’ compliance cost functions as
risk preferences play a relatively minor role in designing an efﬁcient scheme.
From Table  3 the reduction in welfare from adopting the special case is
increasing in the monitoring cost and lies between 0 and 6 per cent.
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